- Santucci, Jack. 2018. "Evidence of a Winning-cohesion Tradeoff under Multi-winner Ranked-choice Voting." Electoral Studies, online. — Suggestive evidence that multi-winner RCV makes majority-seeking parties incorporate new groups. Original roll-call and election data from Cincinnati (1929-57) and Worcester, MA (1949-60).
- Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Party Splits, not Progressives: The Origins of Proportional Representation in American Local Government." American Politics Research 45(3): 494-526. — Past enactments of multi-winner RCV were joint efforts by minority parties and majority-party factions. Mixed methods and original precinct data from three New England cities, 1939-55.
Articles not peer-reviewed
- Santucci, Jack. 2010. "What is the Future for Democracy Promotion?" Democracy & Society 7(1): 5-7. — Argues the U.S. would have an increasingly hard time promoting democracy abroad.
- Santucci, Jack and Magnus Öhman. 2009. "Practical solutions for the disclosure of campaign and political party finance." In Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience, edited by Magnus Öhman and Hani Zainulbhai, 25-42. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. — Documents comparative disclosure rules and summarizes implementation challenges.
- Santucci, Jack. 2006. "The Missing Half: Ensuring Fair Representation in Post-merger Essex, Vermont." National Civic Review 95(3): 42-50. — Summarizes main voting methods for U.S. multi-winner elections.
Working papers on current state & national politics
- Party and cleavage in the 2016 election (under review) — Estimates ideal points for 8,000 Americans. Suggestive evidence that either party can use a fiscally liberal message to cement a national majority.
- Estimating dynamic, common-space public opinion: Why Maine took two decades to adopt ranked-choice voting (revise & resubmit) — Single-winner RCV enactment requires the second-largest party to expect to win on smaller-party voters' transfers.
Working papers on PR in America ("multi-winner RCV")
- Why unions attacked the single transferable vote in Cincinnati (under review) — Documents labor participation in racially charged repeal and shows how the motive was coalition defection in government.
- Exit from proportional representation and implications for ranked-choice voting in American government — Parties that otherwise would benefit from multi-winner RCV oppose it when (1) they do not control the pivotal legislator and (2) expect to survive return to plurality voting.
- The other side of urban reform: Insurgents and issues under city STV, 1930-61 — Early, highly aggregated version of "Evidence of a winning-cohesion tradeoff." Suggests similar dynamic in New York City, 1937-47.
Working papers on ideal points
- Legislator replacement and party position change in American single transferable vote elections — Estimates of dynamic ideal points are sensitive to choice of model start values.
Book project: The American Politics of Proportional Voting
- Abstract: I analyze the politics of the single transferable vote in 24 American cities, 1893-1962. Conventional wisdom treats this as a Progressive revolt against political parties. With several new sets of roll-call and electoral data, I find order where others saw chaos. Whether a party faction constitutes the majority of the majority explains (a) its position on electoral reform and (b) the inclusiveness of its nominating strategy.
- Read the dissertation as I defended it. The middle chapter is heavily revised and forthcoming in Electoral Studies.