- Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Evidence of a Winning-cohesion Tradeoff under Multi-winner Ranked-choice Voting." Forthcoming in Electoral Studies. — Suggestive evidence that multi-winner RCV makes majority-seeking parties incorporate new groups.
- Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Party Splits, not Progressives: The Origins of Proportional Representation in American Local Government." American Politics Research 45(3): 494-526. — Past enactments of multi-winner RCV were joint efforts by minority parties and majority-party factions.
Edited article-length work
- Santucci, Jack. 2010. "What is the Future for Democracy Promotion?" Democracy & Society 7(1): 5-7. — Argues the U.S. would have an increasingly hard time promoting democracy abroad.
- Santucci, Jack and Magnus Öhman. 2009. "Practical solutions for the disclosure of campaign and political party finance." In Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience, edited by Magnus Öhman and Hani Zainulbhai, 25-42. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. — Documents comparative disclosure rules and summarizes implementation challenges.
- Santucci, Jack. 2006. "The Missing Half: Ensuring Fair Representation in Post-merger Essex, Vermont." National Civic Review 95(3): 42-50. — Summarizes main voting methods for U.S. multi-winner elections.
Working papers on modern American politics
- Party and cleavage in the 2016 election. — Estimates ideal points for 8,000 Americans. Identity politics define the party system, and economic issues divide both parties.
- Estimating dynamic, common-space public opinion: Why Maine took two decades to adopt ranked-choice voting. — Single-winner RCV enactment requires the second-largest party to expect to win on smaller-party voters' transfers.
Working papers on PR in America ("multi-winner RCV")
- Bad for party discipline: Why unions attacked the single transferable vote in Cincinnati. — Documents labor participation in racially charged repeal and shows the motive was liberals' coalition defection in government.
- Exit from proportional representation and implications for ranked-choice voting in American government. — Parties that otherwise would benefit from multi-winner RCV oppose it when (1) they do not control the pivotal legislator and (2) expect to survive return to plurality voting.
- The other side of urban reform: Insurgents and issues under city STV, 1930-61. — Early, highly aggregated version of "Evidence of a winning-cohesion tradeoff." Suggests similar dynamic in New York City, 1937-47.
Working papers on ideal points
- Legislator replacement and party position change in American single transferable vote elections. — Estimates of dynamic ideal points are sensitive to choice of model start values.
- Working title: Proportional Voting in America: Rise, Representation, and Decline
Abstract: Ranked-choice voting is a popular idea, and its multi-winner form makes winning office easy. Americans once called this “proportional representation via the single transferable vote” — “PR” for short. I analyze its rise and fall in 24 American cities, 1915-62. Two demands structured these episodes: for minority-party representation, then to bypass elite control of primary elections. To reconcile those demands, reformers compromised on a form of PR that foreclosed on disciplined, multi-party politics. This eased adoption prospects but did not bolster coalition cohesion. When party disunity hurt the second-largest party, it colluded with the largest in repealing PR.
I offer new data covering the American experience with PR: three most-similar charter reform episodes, then 52 city-years of roll-call voting in three most-different cases (Cincinnati, 1929-57; New York City, 1938-47; Worcester, MA, 1950-60). My methods include structured focused comparison, classical regression, ecological inference, and ideal point estimation. An in-progress chapter uses automated text analysis.
- Read the dissertation as I defended it. The middle chapter is heavily revised and forthcoming in Electoral Studies.