- Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Evidence of a Winning-cohesion Tradeoff under Multi-winner Ranked-choice Voting." Forthcoming in Electoral Studies. — Suggestive evidence that multi-winner RCV makes majority-seeking parties incorporate new groups.
- Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Party Splits, not Progressives: The Origins of Proportional Representation in American Local Government." American Politics Research 45(3): 494-526. — Past enactments of multi-winner RCV were joint efforts by minority parties and majority-party factions.
Articles not peer-reviewed
- Santucci, Jack. 2010. "What is the Future for Democracy Promotion?" Democracy & Society 7(1): 5-7. — Argues the U.S. would have an increasingly hard time promoting democracy abroad.
- Santucci, Jack and Magnus Öhman. 2009. "Practical solutions for the disclosure of campaign and political party finance." In Political Finance Regulation: The Global Experience, edited by Magnus Öhman and Hani Zainulbhai, 25-42. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. — Documents comparative disclosure rules and summarizes implementation challenges.
- Santucci, Jack. 2006. "The Missing Half: Ensuring Fair Representation in Post-merger Essex, Vermont." National Civic Review 95(3): 42-50. — Summarizes main voting methods for U.S. multi-winner elections.
Working papers on current state & national politics
- Party and cleavage in the 2016 election (under review) — Estimates ideal points for 8,000 Americans. Suggestive evidence that either party can use a fiscally liberal message to cement a national majority.
- Estimating dynamic, common-space public opinion: Why Maine took two decades to adopt ranked-choice voting (revise & resubmit) — Single-winner RCV enactment requires the second-largest party to expect to win on smaller-party voters' transfers.
Working papers on PR in America ("multi-winner RCV")
- Bad for party discipline: Why unions attacked the single transferable vote in Cincinnati (under review) — Documents labor participation in racially charged repeal and shows how the motive was fiscal conservatives' coalition defection in government.
- Exit from proportional representation and implications for ranked-choice voting in American government — Parties that otherwise would benefit from multi-winner RCV oppose it when (1) they do not control the pivotal legislator and (2) expect to survive return to plurality voting.
- The other side of urban reform: Insurgents and issues under city STV, 1930-61 — Early, highly aggregated version of "Evidence of a winning-cohesion tradeoff." Suggests similar dynamic in New York City, 1937-47.
Working papers on ideal points
- Legislator replacement and party position change in American single transferable vote elections — Estimates of dynamic ideal points are sensitive to choice of model start values.
Book project: The American Politics of Proportional Voting
Abstract: Ranked-choice voting and proportional representation (PR-RCV) have garnered much interest in the past year. How is this enacted, and what does it do to a party system? This book draws on lived experience with PR-RCV in American cities, 1893-1962. Reform finds traction where (a) districting shuts out the minority party and (b) nominating practices shut out organized, majority-party factions. Once in place, PR-RCV forces majority-seeking parties to onboard new groups and ideas. For PR-RCV to survive, the second-largest party or faction must be cohesive and pivotal in government. I draw on a range of data from past use of PR-RCV in major American cities including (but not limited to) three most-similar city charter reforms and 52 city-years of roll-call voting in three most-different cases (Cincinnati, 1929-57; New York City, 1938-47; Worcester, MA, 1950-60). My methods include structured focused comparison, classical regression, ecological inference, and ideal point estimation. An in-progress chapter uses automated text analysis.
- Read the dissertation as I defended it. The middle chapter is heavily revised and forthcoming in Electoral Studies.