

A process-populism dimension in the US public? Evidence from two surveys in 2016

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Abstract

This paper finds a two-dimensional structure in American mass opinion as of 2016. This structure appears in two different data sets for two different question batteries on who should rule and how. The first data set comprises 1,000 respondents and includes the famous stealth-democracy questions. The second comprises 8,000 and includes questions on perceptions of a rigged political and economic system. While some of these issues also help define a traditional, liberal-conservative ideology, others are entirely orthogonal, suggestive of a separate dimension. Further, exploratory analysis of other items defining this dimension tap both process and policy outputs (e.g., trade, social services, and social tolerance). In both data sets, higher scores on this dimension are associated with greater wealth. Lower scores in the larger set are associated with low educational attainment and identifying as “other race.” It will be interesting to learn more about this structure, how it will evolve, and what it ends up meaning for American party politics.

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1 Introduction

A central concern in democratic politics is how people organize themselves (or are organized) for collective action. One mode of organization is the political party. Another is the nature of one's ideology: liberal, conservative, or somewhere in between. Most political scientists would agree that, for the past 40-50 years, party and ideology have been losing their separateness as organizing principles: ever fewer liberal Republicans, ever fewer conservative Democrats.

Yet there are reasons to think that 2016 may be different. At the level of the presidential nominating contest, Donald Trump challenged many conservative positions (e.g., on the goodness of trade and fiscal restraint) – yet won the Republican nomination. In the Democratic camp, Hillary Clinton received criticism for her stance on “identity politics” and a perception of her closeness to financial elites. It is possible that the intra-party battles were symptoms of a broader shift in mass ideological attachment, regardless of whether the candidates actually held those stances. According to one new paper, in fact, responses to a repeat set of 31 survey questions had a measurably two-dimensional structure in 2016, which they did not have in 2012.¹

Beginning with two sets of survey questions about who should rule and how, this paper tests for the existence of a “process-populism” dimension in American politics. Using two recent, national samples of public opinion, I measure the ideal points of 1,000 and 8,000 respondents, respectively. Ideal-point analysis lets us see how issues are configured.

Two dimensions emerge from each data set. The first is a traditional, liberal-conservative divide, which maps well onto presidential voting. The second dimension indeed picks up the survey questions on who should rule and how. Exploratory analysis of this dimension also uncovers social intolerance and frustration with several policy outputs.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the most important literature on mass political opinion. Section 3 asks what some have said about the nature of the second dimension in American politics – should one in fact exist. Section 4 discusses the two main data sets: one a team CCES module with five “stealth-democracy” questions, the other an 8,000-person survey that included six “rigged-system” questions. Both were done in August 2016. Section 5 describes the scaling procedure and states hypotheses about how these items should manifest in ideological space. Section 6 presents results for the question

1. The author and a coauthor, unpublished.

batteries of deductive interest. Section 6 investigates the people who define the second dimension. Section 7 takes an exploratory look at other issues that define the dimension of interest. The final part concludes.

2 The study of mass ideology

As social scientists use it, ideology is a construct that describes what political issues and attitudes tend to come in packages. People can be more or less ideologically constrained, e.g., holding varying blends of the liberal and conservative positions that we use to measure their belief systems. Thus conceived, the modern study of ideology began in the wake of World War II. This was partly in reaction to the rise of fascism, partly as an outgrowth of early efforts to understand campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Converse 1964). One of the earliest results was that most people's beliefs are not very constrained (Campbell et al. 1960).

More recent studies of ideology have sought to disaggregate the public into more and less politically engaged segments. The basic thrust of this literature is consistent with what Campbell et al. (1960) found. One finds low constraint when one takes either (a) a bird's-eye view of the entire public or (b) focuses on the lesser-engaged masses. Those who follow politics most closely, possibly by working or volunteering in it, tend to be more constrained, in that their attitude on one issue helps predict their attitude on another (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina 2010; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).

Psychometric scaling of policy choice is another way to study ideology. Rather than examine attitudes in one-by-one fashion, possibly as predictors of each other or some outcome (e.g., vote choice), the ideal-point approach projects actors into low-dimensional space. One advantage here is that such spaces can be studied theoretically (Hinich and Munger 1994).

Another benefit of the psychometric approach is that we can study a policy space empirically, seeing how people and issues together define it. Why bother doing this? If we accept that ideologies are difficult-to-measure systems of belief, the items we use to tap them will do those jobs imperfectly. The thing we want to know about is latent. By estimating ideal points, we literally can see how the various measures are configured. This, in turn, may tell us something about people's ideologies. At the very least, it tells us about issues that do not define party competition (i.e., do not fall along on the liberal-conservative axis).

The most famous empirical application of ideal-point analysis has been in the

study of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Other studies increasingly look at many other actors – too many to note here – including: state legislators (Shor and McCarty 2011; Masket and Shor 2015), Supreme Court justices (Martin and Quinn 2002; Bailey 2007), U.S. Presidents (Bailey and Chang 2001), city councilors (Burnett 2017; Bucchianeri 2017; Santucci 2018), pundits (Noel 2013), and the members of many foreign assemblies (Jenkins 2000; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Dewan and Spirling 2011; Kellermann 2012; Herrmann and Sieberer 2018).

Several studies over the past 20 years have applied ideal-point analysis to the public as well. The typical approach is to focus on a single dimension (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013; Hill and Tausanovitch 2015; Jessee 2016; Sides et al. 2018), but others have investigated a second dimension.

3 The case for a second dimension

Say an ideal-point routine turned up a second dimension. What might it represent? Three possibilities are apparent from the literature.

The first possibility taps the familiar dichotomy between social and economic issues. According to several sets of scaling results, economics appear on the first dimension, while social issues define the second (Miller and Schofield 2003; Schofield, Miller, and Martin 2003; Miller and Schofield 2008). Treier and Hillygus (2009) use the 2000 American National Election Study to single out some of these social issues: capital punishment, abortion, women’s role in society, and gay rights at least.

An everyday interpretation of the second, “social” dimension might be: mostly race. This is how many of us teach it in undergraduate classes – and not without some precedent. According to Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 45-56), the second dimension was most apparent in Congressional politics during what they call the “three-party system of the mid-twentieth century: the period from the late New Deal into the mid-1970s.” Readers will recall that the Southern faction of the Democratic Party regularly opposed civil-rights legislation during this period. By voting with the Republican Party on those bills, then the Northern Democrats on purportedly economic bills, Southern Democrats created what appear as three distinct blocs in a two-dimensional map of the House, with that group at the top and center.

There are reasons to question a *purely* racial or even social interpretation of the (possibly periodic) second dimension in American politics. The first comes

from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) themselves, noting that the second dimension picked up specifically regional issues and trade policy during the 1890s, i.e., just those issues that might pit the South and West against what Burnham (1982) called the Northeastern “metropole.” Aldrich and Griffin (2018: 201) go even further: “Slavery is obvious, but the threat of the Populist Party in the South was to unite working-class blacks and whites against the middle- and upper-class whites, and that would be done on economic issues such as bimetallism.” Poole’s most recent interpretation holds that the second dimension picks up conflict between each party’s “insider” and “outsider” factions (Poole, Rosenthal, and Hare 2015). Finally, it is worth noting that the coalition to pass the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 over President Truman’s veto – an explicitly economic bill that dealt with labor unions – was precisely the sort of coalition that might oppose a civil-rights bill: Southern Democrats with the Republicans, the former toward the top of 2-D space. Something at least partly economic must be happening on the second, ostensibly social dimension in American politics. And it may be that this dimension appears only periodically, especially if we just look at Congress.

If we set aside the scaling literature for a moment, we get hints of a different and potentially fruitful interpretation. Fiorina (2009), for one, has insisted on a qualitative difference between the “political class” and masses. The former reflects more attitude constraint, while the public, he says, is moderate and pragmatic. Others have shown group-level variation in support for norms and policies associated with liberal democracy and limited government (Drutman, Diamond, and Goldman 2017).

The second possibility might begin with Lipset (1959a), who once posited the existence of two main dimensions in democratic politics: economic liberalism, then one dealing with “democratic norms.” This second dimension, a sort of patience-and-tolerance dimension, appears in his earlier, more famous essay as follows: “A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower class” (Lipset 1959b: 83). Working-class people, he argued in the later essay, do not fundamentally care about patience-and-tolerance issues because economics are their main concern. Whether they manifest (or accept) positions of tolerance and gradualism would depend on two things: (1) the issue leadership of their respective parties, (2) the success of which would vary with perceptions that economic needs are met. “It is probable,” he writes, “that organized social democracy not only supports civil liberties but influences its supporters in the same direction” (Lipset 1959a: 500). Given the waning force of welfare-state policies in recent years (Bonica et al. 2013; Page and Gilens 2017), it is possible that the now-apparent second dimension picks up attitudes

toward the state of liberal-democratic politics. Another way to say this might be populism.

Subsequent work in the populism vein has sought to distinguish it from nativism. Both ideologies, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), grow out of frustration with perceptions that a party system has become unresponsive. Both forms accordingly seek to divide society into uncorrupted masses and a corrupt elite. Populism and nativism offer two ways to do this. The first combines its appeal with elements of socialism. The second uses nationalism to define certain people out of the political community. According to Mudde (2017), both forms are hostile to political liberalism and require nimble attention from the liberal-democratic establishment.

A populism (and/or nativism) thesis stands in partial contrast to a third possibility: that attitudes toward democratic processes are independent of concrete policy preferences. The idea here is that, while citizens generally do not desire more participation, this attitude waxes and wanes with perceptions of corruption (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Dyck and Baldassare 2009, 2012).

4 Data

Two question batteries in two new data sets let us test the hypothesis that a process-populism dimension cross-cuts the liberal-conservative divide. I will say more about its substantive content in two exploratory sections at the end of this paper.

The first data set is the Reed College module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), the relevant part of which was done in August 2016. The CCES regularly includes a range of questions about attitudes toward social, economic, environmental, and other policies. Under the direction of Paul Gronke and in partnership with Natalie Adona of the Democracy Fund, the Reed module asked several additional questions of 1,000 randomly sampled respondents in the wider CCES. These extra questions covered attitudes toward various levels of government, election administrators, various election reforms, and electoral integrity issues.

The Reed module also asked five “stealth-democracy” questions on attitudes toward who should hold political power and how they should use it (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). These agree-disagree statements were as follows:

1. Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems.

2. What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
3. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people.
4. Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people.
5. When people argue about political issues, it makes me feel uncomfortable.

Within the stealth-democracy battery, two questions seem especially relevant: questions 3 and 4 on government by “successful business people” and “non-elected, independent experts.” Table 1 shows that just about a quarter of Americans agreed with those statements, with fairly even proportions in each presidential camp.

	Clinton (D)	Other	Trump (R)	Overall
Just take action	76.3	70.0	80.5	75.9
Compromise is selling out	23.4	48.6	53.2	40.0
Business run gov’t	7.7	14.3	51.4	25.3
Unelected experts	24.9	32.9	33.9	30.6
Arguing uncomfortable	31.3	19.7	30.6	33.1

Table 1: Percentage agreeing with each statement, both overall and in each camp, CCES-Reed College stealth-democracy battery.

The second data set is the 2016 Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) survey, commissioned by the Voter Study Group (VSG), and also done by YouGov in August 2016. The VSG is a set of political scientists and public-opinion researchers affiliated with the Democracy Fund. One big goal of their 8,000-respondent VOTER survey was to better understand the issue clusters that define the factions in each party.

Within the VSG data, six “rigged-system” questions seem like they may tap populism and/or frustration in the public. The agree-disagree statements were:

1. Elections today don’t matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in.
2. America is a fair society where everyone has the opportunity to get ahead.

3. Our economic system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Americans.
4. You can't believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media.
5. People like me don't have any say in what the government does.
6. Elites in this country don't understand the problems I am facing.

Table 2 presents the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement above, as well as that percentage in each general-election bloc. Several of these questions appear to reflect partisanship. Trump supporters overwhelmingly expressed agreement with the fundamental fairness of American society and mistrust of the mainstream media, while Clinton supporters overwhelmingly agreed that the "economic system is biased." At the same time, though, substantial numbers in the opposing parties also agreed with these statements. Finally, nearly 83 percent of the sample said that "elites don't understand." Each of these questions seems like it might help define a second dimension.

	Clinton (D)	Other	Trump (R)	Overall
Elections don't matter	35.0	53.3	30.1	35.1
America is fair	30.3	52.6	82.8	55.9
Economy is biased	95.5	76.3	47.0	72.0
Can't believe the media	43.7	76.4	93.2	69.2
Ppl like me have no say	59.5	66.2	53.7	57.8
Elites don't understand	84.0	84.8	82.5	83.4

Table 2: Percentage agreeing with each statement, both overall and in each camp, Voter Study Group rigged-system battery.

Finally, both the Reed and VSG data sets include standard demographic variables. These can be used to see whether certain kinds of people systematically have certain kinds of scores on the second dimension.

5 Methods and hypotheses

I use ideal-point estimation to project both surveys' respondents and policy questions into low-dimensional space. All such approaches make the following assumptions: (1) every voter or person has an ideal point in policy space, (2)

policy alternatives have locations in that space, and (3) a voter chooses the policy or candidate that is closest to their ideal point.

Following Hare (2015), I use the non-parametric, optimal-classification (OC) method developed by Keith Poole (2000, 2005). Versus NOMINATE and other common approaches (e.g., Bayesian item-response per Jackman (2001)), OC does not impose a functional form on the structure of survey responses. Nor does it rest on any assumptions about the utility function that respondents use when answering a question. OC simply finds the best possible ordering of survey respondents and questions, given the number of dimensions supplied, for classifying answers correctly. In two (or more) dimensions, this model produces respondents' ideal points, then a cutting line (or plane) for each survey question.

Preparing the data involved two steps. The first was selecting a set of questions to analyze. In keeping with the micro-foundations of the ideal-point approach, I selected only those questions with some policy component. In all, this amounted to 97 questions from the Reed-CCES data, then 60 questions from the VSG. Finally, if responses were not binary, I collapsed them to make them so. A respondent who either "agrees" or "somewhat agrees" is coded as a "yea" or 1. Those who disagree at all are coded as "nays" or 0s. Finally, those who "neither agree nor disagree" are coded as not voting (9), with missing values preserved throughout. Collapsing values in this way produces a roll-call-style matrix.²

For each data set, I estimated ideal points in one, two, and three dimensions. Overall, it appears that two dimensions are sufficient to explain answers to most questions. Table 3 gives fit statistics for each of the routines. On the left, we see the percentage of responses correctly classified (PCC). Aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) appears on the right. Both are standard ways to assess the fit of ideal-point models. PCC is straightforward. APRE weights algorithm performance by ease of the classification task, penalizing those questions where very few people take the minority position (i.e., where classification is easy). Table 3 shows marked classification improvement in both figures when moving from one to two dimensions and much less improvement when moving from two to three dimensions.³

2. For three ranking questions on the CCES, I treated the top-ranked item as a "yea" and items ranked 2 or lower as "nay." For two 0-100 thermometer items, I treated ratings greater than 50 as "yea," less than 50 as "nay," and ratings of 50 as abstentions. Hare, Liu, and Lupton (2018) have since developed an OC method that does not require binary responses. I will use this in future work.

3. For the Reed-CCES data, a third dimension does improve classification more than it does for the VSG data – albeit marginally so. Computing marginal proportional reduction in

	Pct. CC	APRE
Reed-CCES, 1 dimension	77.9	0.319
Reed-CCES, 2 dimensions	81.6	0.434
Reed-CCES, 3 dimensions	83.6	0.496
VSG, 1 dimension	85.2	0.469
VSG, 2 dimensions	88.4	0.581
VSG, 3 dimensions	89.6	0.626

Table 3: Overall optimal-classification model fits: percent of answers correctly classified and aggregate proportional reduction in error.

Finally, tables 4 and 5 give question-level fit as percentage of responses correctly classified for the stealth-democracy and rigged-system batteries, respectively. All but one question (discomfort with political argument) registers an acceptable fit.

Reed question	Pct. CC
Just take action	93.2
Compromise is selling out	82.9
Business run gov't	85.0
Unelected experts	72.5
Arguing uncomfortable	69.6

Table 4: Reed stealth-democracy questions, percent correct classification in two dimensions.

In testing for the existence of a process (or populist-elite) dimension, we are mainly interested in the cutting lines for the respective survey questions. Whether a cutting line defines this or that dimension depends on its angle. If the principal dimension is left-right conservatism, issues defining that dimension will have vertical cutting lines (e.g., around 90 degrees). In other words, those issues will separate conventional left from right. Second-dimension issues will separate top from bottom; their cutting lines will be closer to 0 or 180 degrees.

error (Roberts, Smith, and Haptonstahl 2015) for the stealth-democracy questions, however, does not reveal much improvement for that group of questions. This may be due to the relatively smaller data matrix, which is known to depress APRE (Bucchianeri 2017), or due to the presence of many unconventional questions (e.g., whether ranked-choice voting will reduce corruption.) For these reasons, I present results from the two-dimension model of the Reed data.

VSG question	Pct. CC
Elections don't matter	80.9
America is fair	87.4
Economy is biased	90.4
Can't believe the media	86.3
Ppl like me have no say	80.9
Elites don't understand	87.7

Table 5: VSG rigged-system questions, percent correct classification in two dimensions.

Cutting lines also may run diagonally. When this is the case, they capture bits of both dimensions, helping to define liberal-conservative as well as process (or populist-elite).

If the second dimension represents what we expect, several things will be true about the cutting lines and/or angles for the stealth-democracy and rigged-system questions:

1. Traditional, left-right issues will define the first dimension. Most Democrats will appear on the left of two-dimensional space, and most Republicans will appear on its right.
2. The lion's share of issues will have vertically-running angles, continuing to define a liberal-conservative dimension.
3. Cutting lines for the batteries of interest will run horizontally or at least diagonally, with angles around or less than 45 degrees, then around or greater than 135 degrees.

6 Results and discussion

Figures 1 and 2 present the spatial maps. Respondents' ideal points are given as "D" if they said they voted for Hillary Clinton, "R" if Donald Trump, and "O" if they voted for a third-party candidate or did not vote at all. Cutting lines for the stealth and rigged questions appear in each plot. In the Reed-CCES plot, to facilitate interpretation, I also include cutting lines for two other questions:

- White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. (This is a standard CCES question. 53.4 percent agreed.)

- How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right? (This was from the Reed module. 15.4 percent said “most of the time” or “always.”)

Both plots confirm the existence of a standard, liberal-conservative dimension that runs from left to right. Several cutting lines in the Reed data support this interpretation. The one for white-skin advantage separates virtually all Democrats from most Republicans. In the Reed data, and even though they were hypothesized to tap a second dimension, two stealth-democracy questions at least help define liberalism and conservatism. One of them, for successful business people running the government, separates most Democrats from most Republicans – notably with a very small number of Democrats on the “agree” side, at the top of the space, then a not-insignificant number of Republicans on its opposite. Similarly, the cutting line for “compromise is really just selling out” appears to have become a liberal-conservative issue. Many would agree that refusal to compromise has become a feature of conservatism (Chait 2011).

Turning to the VSG data, some of the rigged-system angles also run diagonally. Those that stand out most are: “Our economic system is biased in favor of the wealthiest Americans” and “You can’t believe much of what you hear from the mainstream media.” The former separates many Democrats from many Republicans, and the latter does vice-versa. At the same time, a substantial set of opposite-party persons holds each of these views: respondents toward the middle and bottom of the space.

Figure 3 provides a more direct test of the liberal-conservative hypothesis: that the lion’s share of angles will hover around 90 degrees. This figure also tests the hypothesis that the process-populism questions will be clearly off-dimension. These two histograms represent the distribution of estimated cutting lines in each data set. Small triangles at the bottoms of the plots represent the angles for the stealth-democracy and rigged-system questions. In the Reed data, the modal cutting line is just around 90 degrees, with three of the five stealth-democracy questions having angles of about 135 degrees or more. In the VSG data, all six questions have clearly diagonal cutting lines, if not almost perfectly horizontal.

Some reflection on the questions themselves and their positions in the space will help us begin to interpret the meaning of this dimension. Beginning with the Reed data, trust in the federal government is limited to those at the top of the space. So is preference for government by “successful business people,” although fewer Democrats express this view. A bipartisan group at the top of the space reports discomfort with political argument and preference for rule by




Figure 1: Ideal points and stealth-democracy cutting lines (with white-people advantage and trust in federal government), CCES-Reed College.




Figure 2: Ideal points and rigged-system cutting lines, VSG.




Figure 3: Distributions of cutting-line angles with positions of rigged-system and stealth-democracy questions.

“non-elected, independent experts.” Each of these cutting lines suggests elitism, although none clearly disentangles process attitudes from policy ones.

In the VSG data, by contrast, we get a sense of anti-elite sentiment. The cutting line for “elites don’t understand the problems I am facing” clearly separates a handful at the very top from the mass of people in both parties. Moving down this figure, we next encounter “people like me don’t have any say” and then the more extreme statement: “elections today don’t matter; things stay the same no matter who we vote in.” Where the Reed data give evidence of elitism, the VSG data suggest a sort of process populism.

In the next two sections, I turn to the process-versus-policy question. One section looks at the people along this dimension. The second looks at other cutting lines defining it.

Who defines the second dimension?

Can we identify the sorts of people who tend to occupy either end of this second dimension? Figures 4 and 5 provide some insight here. For each data set, I estimated a simple, dummy-variable regression (with appropriate survey weights) of the second-dimension score on several demographic attributes. The plots

represent estimated coefficients, sorted in descending order of magnitude. Similar variables cluster in similar spaces across the two data sets.

Perhaps due to the relatively small sample size, fewer coefficients in the Reed data are precisely estimated. Several variables do stand out as predictors of upward positions on the second dimension: college education, graduate education, and family income over \$60,000. The picture in the VSG is clearer, with its N of 8,000. The highest-income respondents have the highest second-dimension scores. Meanwhile, high-school education or less predict negative scores on the second dimension. So does reporting a racial identity of “other.”

Interestingly, vote choice in the 2016 primaries does not separate putative populists from elites. We might expect it to do so because two candidates ran self-consciously populist campaigns: Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. I reran each regression above with dummy variables for reported primary vote: Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, John Kasich, Ted Cruz, and Donald Trump, with “did not vote” and “other” as a combined reference category. Each of these variables registers with a statistically significant and *positive* coefficient. It may be that the people at the very bottom of the second dimension tend to be nonvoters. That would make sense because primary electorates tend to be the most politically engaged.

Even though primary voting does not systematically predict negative second-dimension scores, a visual inspection of the ideal points is telling. Figures 6 and 7 offer density plots of ideal points on each dimension, for each primary bloc, for each data set. Sanders and Cruz voters anchor the left and right of the liberal-conservative dimension in each. On the second dimension, Sanders voters anchor the left most clearly in the VSG data, with a clear mass of ideal points distinct from those in every other camp. Sanders voters also anchor the second-dimension left in the Reed data, although much less starkly than in the VSG data. For those who might cast Sanders as a populist, these ideal-point distributions give some support to a populist-elite interpretation. It is worth noting, though, that many Sanders voters still had positive scores.

7 What other issues define the second dimension?

So far, I have shown that attitudes about who ought to rule help define a second dimension in public opinion. It is tempting to interpret this as a “process” di-

**Correlates of second-dimension score:
CCES-Reed College**




Figure 4: OLS estimates of association with second-dimension score, Reed-CCES data.

**Correlates of second-dimension score:
Voter Study Group**




Figure 5: OLS estimates of association with second-dimension score, VSG data.





Figure 6: Ideal points by primary vote, CCES-Reed College.





Figure 7: Ideal points by primary vote, Voter Study Group.

mension, with people simply griping about a hard-to-understand political system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).

Does the second dimension have any substantive policy content? One way to check is to ask what other survey questions have orthogonal (to liberal-conservative) cutting lines. One systematic way to do that is to look at items with angles greater than 135 degrees or less than 45 degrees. These are questions that do more to define the second dimension than the first.

In the VSG data, several off-dimension questions capture economic issues. Others capture tolerance, perhaps consistent with Lipset's two-dimension thesis. These questions are:

- Life in America for people like me, compared to 50 years ago (139 degrees, 79 percent correct classification);
- Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in the U.S. (144 degrees, 88 percent);
- Importance of infrastructure investment (166 degrees, 96 percent);
- Importance of the abortion issue (170 degrees, 94 percent);
- A five-question battery on expanding free trade (167, 173, 173, 173, and 174 degrees, respectively, and 90, 93, 74, 90, and 92 percent correct classification, respectively).
- Importance of immigration (39 degrees, 89 percent);
- Importance of religious liberty (32 degrees, 90 percent);
- And importance of jobs (2 degrees, 91 percent).

Turning to the CCES data, there are several such issues. Many deal with electoral integrity and policy toward campaign contributions. The most extreme angles (greater than 170 or less than 10 degrees) deal with attitudes toward local government, zoning policies, local roads, and education policy. Correct classification for each item is 76 percent or greater, with most items getting scores of more than 80 percent.

In sum, people at the bottom of the second dimension tend to want more social services and less foreign trade. They are also skeptical about women's rights and religious tolerance. Going back to Lipset (1959a: 495) may be useful here:

...the lower-class individual is more likely to have been exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early childhood, experiences which often produce deep-rooted hostilities expressed by *ethnic prejudice, political authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational religion. His educational attainment is less than that of men with higher socio-economic status...*

8 Conclusion

This paper hypothesized and gave evidence of a second, process-populism dimension in American public opinion. This dimension is orthogonal to liberal-conservative ideology, which continues to define competition between the major parties, at least in the 2016 presidential election. People with high scores on this dimension tend to make more money and have more formal education. In the larger of my data sets, people with the lowest scores tend to have less education. Also in the larger set, membership in one racial out group predicts lower scores on elitism. Finally, people who voted for Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primary are to the left of most other respondents on this second dimension, although not in an extreme way.

Survey items not in the batteries of deductive interest also lined up with this second dimension: attitudes toward education, foreign trade, local government, and social services. These are policy outputs that some might say have atrophied or changed a lot of late. Meanwhile, several hints of intolerance show up here: toward women, immigrants, and people of other religions. Issue leadership matters, especially when times are tough.

Given available data, I cannot say whether this dimension existed in the past. An historical view suggests it has, at least in Congress, at least at certain points. Future research should more fully interrogate the second dimension in American politics (Bateman and Lapinski 2016). The trend in large opinion surveys will make this easier to do. One interesting thing to watch will be how this dimension interacts with liberal-conservative, especially as the next presidential election approaches.

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