I am a Georgetown Ph.D. candidate working on parties and voting rules in America.
My current project is on the use of proportional representation (PR) in American cities, 1915-61. Working from the perspective of policy-seeking party factions, I analyze three outcomes: PR's adoption, its repeal, and coalition stability under PR. Mixed-method comparison of rule-change episodes shows that PR enactment requires an alliance between ruling-party defectors and one or more opposing parties. Using roll-call scaling techniques and archival records from three representative cities (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1929-57; New York City, 1938-47; and Worcester, Massachusetts, 1950-61), I show how keeping PR required tolerating the veto of a second-largest faction. I then combine the roll calls with electoral data to show how PR let insurgent factions reshape legislative coalitions. The analysis suggests de facto multiparty government can coexist with the two-party system. This happens when parties' constituent factions gain access to power through permissive voting rules.
I have other projects about the repeal of non-majoritarian elections to state legislatures, the domestic spread of fixed-term parliamentarism, and factionalism in contemporary local government.