I am a Georgetown Ph.D. candidate working on parties and voting rules in the United States. My research stems from the belief that polarization is harmful. My academic writing has appeared in American Politics Research, National Civic Review, The Monkey Cage, and USAPP.

I can speak from hard data about the following topics: election reform, ranked-choice voting (a.k.a. instant runoff, alternative vote), proportional representation, the single transferable vote, and legislative behavior consistent with each.

Dissertation

Could the United States sustain a more open electoral system? What happens when you combine proportional representation (PR) with American legislative institutions? How might PR win in the first place? I look for answers in the last wave of reform, 1915-60.

The American path to PR involves negotiation of new rules between a ruling-party faction and one or more out-parties. The result is a multi-party system (in practice if not name).

Whether PR is stable depends on how parties approach legislative bargaining. When a multi-party coalition can be fluid (i.e., will not face a snap election), its largest party can get hurt. This leads the system's largest parties to attack smaller ones by changing the voting rules. Reforms that lower electoral thresholds therefore must come with devices for cementing legislative coalitions.

This project also gives the first quantitative history of PR in American cities. I draw on newspapers, archives, and newly digitized data from three very different party systems: Cincinnati (1925-57); New York City (1937-47); and Worcester, Mass. (1947-60). No, the state/national party system did not simply reassert itself in these cities. In at least one, the party that PR wrought was critical to ending PR.

Thanks for reading.